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Abstract
Formulating theoretical models inevitably requires various simplifications that assist in making analysis tractable and that
facilitate deriving closed form solutions. While the strategic insights gained from theoretical models of market phenomena
are often quite valuable, testing the theoretical assumptions made in these models can aid in assessing the broader
applicability of the conclusions drawn. This is particularly true in the channels area, where the focus of research to date
has largely been theoretical in nature.
In an initial attempt to examine some of the assumptions made in previous theoretical research (e.g., Jeuland and Shugan
1983, McGuire and Staelin 1983, Choi 1991, Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar 1995), we focus on a limited set of issues. First,
we empirically examine the vertical channel assumptions made in two well-cited models of retailer-manufacturer
interaction: a) the Choi (1991) Manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) model, and b) the Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar (1995)
Stackelberg model addressing store brands. Specifically, empirical tests are developed for Manufacturer Stackelberg
conduct and the use of proportional mark-up rules within the channel. Second, since each of these models assume
relatively simple linear demand structures, we examine how well linear demands characterize actual market behavior by
comparing them to a flexible non-linear form, the LA/AIDS model.
The empirical analysis is conducted using data for six individual categories (milk, butter, bread, pasta, margarine and
instant coffee) across 59 local markets in 1991 and 1992. The empirical results generally support the assumptions of
proportional mark-up behavior by retailers and Manufacturer Stackelberg conduct (Choi 1991) within the channel. While
this lends support to the assumptions made in a number of theoretical models addressing channel behavior, we reject
linear demands in a favor of a more flexible non-linear form. When combined with the analytical work of Lee and Staelin
(1997), this suggests that additional theoretical and empirical work is needed in order to fully understand the implications
of using a linear demand specification.
Keywords: Pricing; Channels; Private Labels; Competitive StrategyVertical Strategic Interaction and Demand Functional Form Cotterill and Putsis
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1. Introduction.
Formulating theoretical models inevitably requires
various simplifications that assist in making analysis
tractable and that facilitate deriving closed form
solutions. While the strategic insights gained from
theoretical models of market phenomena are often quite
valuable, understanding and assessing the theoretical
underpinnings of these models can aid in assessing the
broader applicability of the conclusions drawn. More
specifically, empirical analysis can i) assist in providing
perspective on how realistic the assumptions made in the
theoretical analysis are, ii) guide theoretical researchers
to critically examine the robustness of the conclusions
drawn from assumptions that may only partially reflect
actual market behavior, and iii) provide guidance for
future theoretical research.
This is particularly true in the channels area, where
the focus of research to date has largely been theoretical
in nature. For example, while previous work (e.g.,
Jeuland and Shugan 1983, McGuire and Staelin 1983,
Choi 1991, Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar 1995) has
generally assumed a linear demand structure, Moorthy
and Fader (1990) noted that in a bilateral monopoly, the
form of the demand function is directly associated with
type of strategic interaction within the channel. Building
on this, recent theoretical work (Lee and Staelin 1997)
has shown that “the type of vertical strategic interaction
present in a given environment is closely related with the
convexity of the demand curve and the level of demand
for a given price” (p. 185). They demonstrate that a
demand structure of the type used in Raju, Sethuraman
and Dhar (1995) and Choi (1991) leads to positive
within-channel reactions, whereas non-linear demand
structure can lead to positive, negative or no reaction
within the channel. Further, as demonstrated elsewhere
(Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar 1998, Genesove and Mullin
1998), assuming linear demands implies a fixed and
constant pass-through rate within the channel, which
imposes a fairly restrictive constraint on vertical
behavior.
In an initial attempt to examine some of the
assumptions inherent in previous theoretical research
(e.g., Jeuland and Shugan 1983, McGuire and Staelin
1983, Choi 1991, Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar 1995), we
focus on a limited set of issues. First, we empirically
examine the channel assumptions made in two well-cited
models of retailer-manufacturer interaction: a) the Choi
(1991) Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model, and b)
the Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar (1995) Stackelberg
model of store brand introduction. We focus on the Choi
(1991) paper in part because it forms the basis for much
of the analysis in subsequent research, including Lee and
Staelin (1997). We focus on the Raju, Sethuraman and
Dhar (1995) framework since it directly addresses issues
pertaining to private labels and national brands, which is
the focus of our empirical application. Further, the
Manufacturer Stackelberg assumption used in both
models have often been used in more recent research as
well (e.g., Narasimhan and Wilcox 1998). Second, since
each of these models assumes a linear demand structure,
we examine how well the linear demand specification
characterizes actual market behavior by comparing them
to a flexible non-linear functional form
1. In assessing the
assumptions that underlie these models, we are not
asserting a priori that these theoretical models are
necessarily deficient in any way. Rather, we seek to
demonstrate how empirical analysis can be used to
complement existing theoretical work and guide future
research towards assumptions that are consistent with
empirical observation.
The first portion of the paper is analytical in nature
and it proceeds as follows. We begin by presenting the
Choi (1991) and Raju, et al. (1995) models in turn,
deriving the associated reaction functions for each under
strategic profit maximizing behavior. With an eye to our
empirical application, we focus on two brands, one a
national brand and one a private label. We then
demonstrate that the Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar (1995)
and the Choi (1991) Manufacturer Stackelberg models
can be represented as special cases of a more general
class of mark-up models. This provides a direct
connection between the theoretical framework used in
both papers and the mark-up assumptions made in much
of the empirical IO literature (e.g., Kadiyali, Vilcassim
and Chintagunta 1998, Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar 1998).
Empirical tests are then developed for Manufacturer
Stackelberg conduct and the use of proportional mark-up
rules within the channel. In order to address the
assumption of linear demands, we then present a general
non-linear functional demand specification based upon
the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System
(LA/AIDS, Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar 1998). The reaction
function associated with this non-linear model is
sufficiently general to permit Manufacturer Stackelberg
behavior within the channel, thereby making it directly
comparable to the Choi (1991) and Raju, et al. (1995)
models.
In our empirical application, we estimate demands
and price reactions simultaneously, comparing  the
results obtained for each of the three models applied to
data for six individual categories: milk, butter, bread,
                                                       
1. We note that empirical work in this area (e.g., Putsis and
Dhar 1998, Kadiyali, Chintagunta and Vilcassim 1997) has
also generally assumed linear demands.Vertical Strategic Interaction and Demand Functional Form Cotterill and Putsis
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D R c R p R R p 13 1 12 2 11 10 1 + + + = (28)
D R c R p R R p 23 2 22 1 21 20 2 + + - = , (29)
where all variables are defined earlier except for c1 and
c2, which are instruments for unobserved marginal costs,
and D, which denotes a series of demand shift variables
needed for empirical analysis.
To begin, we note that both the Choi (1991) and Raju,
et al. (1995) demand models assume symmetric price
response – specifically, they assume that the own and
cross price responses are the same for private labels and
national brands (see equations 1, 16 and 17),
respectively. Thus, if either demand model is to be
supported empirically, the following must hold:
A A 11 21 0 - = (30a)
A A 12 22 0 - = (30b)
If we reject the “symmetry” restrictions (30a) and (30b)
empirically, we conclude that the demand structure is
consistent with neither the Choi (1991) linear or Raju et
al. (1995) restricted Shubik demands. In the event that
we are unable to reject these symmetry restrictions, we
then proceed to test whether the demand structure is
more consistent with the Choi (1991) or Raju, et al.
(1995) specifications. In order to do this, we note that as
discussed in section 2b, the Choi (1991) demand model
imposes the additional assumption of equal intercepts for
private labels and national brands. Thus, if:
A A 10 20 0 - = (31)
then the system is consistent with the Choi (1991)
demand specification, and if  A A 10 20 0 - „  then it is
consistent with Raju, et al. (1995) demand specification.
To test for Manufacturer Stackelberg conduct, note
that thus far we have considered two forms of retailer
behavior in a Manufacturer Stackelberg environment
under the Choi (1991) and Raju, et al. (1995) demand
models. First, we considered the case of strategic profit
maximizing retailers (e.g., equations 11 and 18 for
national brands in the Choi and Raju, et al. models,
respectively) and then we considered the use of
proportional mark-up behavior by retailers (e.g.,
equations 23 and 24 for national brands in the Choi and
Raju, et al. models, respectively). Note that for both
forms of retailer behavior, the price coefficient in each
price reaction equation equals g / 2b (see equations 11,
18, 23, 24). Thus, for national brands, equation (32) must
hold (and analogously, equation 33 for private labels) if
either model is to be consistent with Manufacturer
Stackelberg conduct within the channel:
4  







0 - = (32)







0 - = (33)
Imposing the restrictions in (32) and (33) provides a test
for a Manufacturer Stackelberg relationship between
manufacturers and retailers for national brands and
private labels, respectively.
5  We
also note that if:










then the private label reaction function is consistent with
(15), suggesting that private label manufacturers sell to
retailers at competitive prices (i.e., at marginal cost).
If the retailer operates under a proportional mark-up
rule, the following relationship must also hold (see the
discussion in section 2c following equation 23):
                                                       
4. We note that it can be shown that this test is more general
and is not dependent upon the specific assumptions made in
the Choi (1991) or Raju, et al. (1995) demand models – that is,
it does not necessitate our accepting either demand model.
Indeed, for certain categories (butter, margarine, and instant
coffee), we reject the Choi and Raju, et al. demand models,
but are able to accept Manufacturer Stackelberg conduct.
5. We note that in developing these tests, we examine only the
price coefficients in the price reaction equations (see, e.g.,
equations 11, 18, 23, 24 for national brands), although more
generally, we would need to examine the intercept terms as
well. However, in the empirical analysis discussed below, for
each category where we observe Manufacturer Stackelberg
behavior, we also find proportional markup conduct
(equations 36 and 37). Thus, in the interest of parsimony, we
do not include the intercept term (e.g., as in restrictions 36 and
37 below) in the Manufacturer Stackelberg tests presented
here. Extending these to the more general case that also allows
us to test retailer profit maximizing behavior (see equations 11
and 18 for national brands) is trivial.Vertical Strategic Interaction and Demand Functional Form Cotterill and Putsis
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dollar market share weighted averages.
6 For each model,
a series of demand shift variables (D
ij), cost shift
variables (c
ij) and a series of variables controlling for
structural market characteristics (e.g., concentration)
were included in the analysis. Chart 1 includes a list of
the variables used in the empirical analysis.
3.2 Empirical Methodology
To summarize the discussion above, we presented
and estimated three potential models of pricing conduct
employing three-stage least squares, using both nested
and non-nested tests:   
• Choi’s (1991) linear demand model with
Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) conduct,
 
• Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar’s (1995) model
specifying restricted Shubik demands with
Manufacturer Stackelberg conduct, and
• LA/AIDS (non-linear) demands assuming
Manufacturer Stackelberg conduct.
We proceeded as follows. First, using the tests
described in section 2d (restrictions 30 and 31), we
tested whether the Choi (1991) or Raju demands more
closely represent the underlying demand structure,
allowing for the possibility that neither was consistent
with the data. Second, in order to test the assumptions
regarding channel behavior for each of the models
studied, we test for Manufacturer Stackelberg conduct
and proportional mark-up behavior (restrictions 32, 33,
36, 37). Third, using these results (Choi or Raju;
Manufacturer Stackelberg or not; proportional mark-up
or not), we then tested the general linear demand
specification (equations 26 to 29) against the LA/AIDS
non-linear form using non-nested hypothesis tests
                                                       
6. For example, aggregate private label and national brand
variables were created for share, price and price reduction.
Private label (national brand) share is sum of all private label
(national) brands in the ith market, jth category.  Private
label (national brand) price is the volume-weighted average
price of all private labels (national brands) in the ith market,
jth category.  The two price reduction variables are volume-
weighted percent price reduction for all private label and
branded products, respectively.  Thus, for price and share,
we have four aggregate variables: total branded share, total
private label share, volume-weighted average price of
national brands, and the volume-weighted average price of
private label products. Also, note that the choice of variables
was influenced by data availability.  For example, no coupon
information was available, while average age, income and
percent Hispanic were the only local demographic variables
available.
(Davidson and MacKinnon 1981, Balasubramanian and
Jain 1994). This provided a direct test of whether or not
the non-linear form (assuming essentially the same
channel structure) fits better for each of the six
categories, and if it does indeed fit better, how much
better. If, at the conclusion of our empirical analysis, we
are able to provide cross-category empirical support for
the within-channel assumptions made by Choi (1991)
and by Raju, et al. (1995), and if we are not able to
improve the demand-side fit by moving to a non-linear
form, we would argue that this provides a great deal of
support for the assumptions made in these and related
models.
4.  Empirical Results
Table 1 presents the results from the hypotheses tests
used to determine a) whether the Choi (1991) or Raju, et
al. (1995) demand model best fit the data, and b) which
form of within channel behavior best fits the data
(Section 2d above).
Examining Table 1, we can see that the Choi (1991)
demand model fits best for the bread category, while the
Raju, et al. (1995) modified Shubik demands are more
consistent with the milk and pasta categories. In fact, the
milk and pasta are consistent with all of the central
assumptions of the Raju, et al. (1995) model, while the
bread category fits all key Choi (1991) MS assumptions.
However, we reject both models in the butter, margarine
and instant coffee categories. Regarding vertical
conduct, out of 12 tests for Stackelberg price reaction
coefficients (6 for national brands and 6 for private
labels), all but 3 are consistent with Stackelberg
behavior within the channel. For the 9 cases where we
accept Manufacturer Stackelberg conduct, all 9 are
consistent with proportional mark-up behavior within the
channel.
Note that the inability to reject Stackelberg and
proportional mark-up behavior for almost all within
channel pricing behavior (and for essentially all private
label pricing) is consistent with the assumption of
Stackelberg proportional mark-up behavior used in much
of the previous research. For example, the assumptions
of Manufacturer Stackelberg and proportional mark-up
behavior within the channel (e.g., Choi 1991, Raju,
Sethuraman and Dhar 1995, Narasimhan and Wilcox
1998, Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar 1998) may be quite
reasonable. Further, the use of proportional mark-up
assumptions in the empirical IO literature (e.g., Kadiyali,
Vilcassim and Chintagunta 1998) may be consistent with
observed behavior as well.
Can we say the same about the linear demand
structure? We present two sets of results. Table 2Vertical Strategic Interaction and Demand Functional Form Cotterill and Putsis
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presents the estimated demand and price reaction
elasticities for the LA/AIDS functional form. These
parameter estimates have not only a great deal of face
validity, but are also consistent with previous research
on a number of dimensions. For example, Tellis (1988)
in a meta-analysis of reported demand elasticities, found
the mean price elasticity of demand to be -1.71,
consistent with the national brand elasticities reported in
the first row of Table 2. In addition, we find significant
asymmetric price response – the estimated private label
own price elasticities are higher in most categories.
However, this asymmetry is reversed in the butter
category, which is consistent with recent work by
Bronnenberg and Wathieu (1996). In terms of the price
reaction elasticities, the price reactions of national
brands were small in magnitude, with the highest price
reaction by national brands occurring in the category
with one of the highest private label shares (margarine).
Overall, the reported price reactions are very close to
those reported by Lambin (1976) and others (e.g.,
Hanssens, Parsons and Schultz 1990, pp. 201-210).
Alternatively, the results for the Choi (1991) and
Raju, et al. (1995) linear demand specifications
presented in Table 3 show fewer significant coefficients
and a great deal more volatility in the parameter
estimates.  While there is some consistency between the
magnitude of the significant demand elasticities for the
linear and the LA/AIDS specifications, there are not
many significant parameter estimates in Table 3.  For
both the linear demand and price reaction elasticities, a
number of parameter estimates are outside of the range
reported in other studies. For example, the estimated
price reaction elasticity of 2.1 (which is significant at a
= .01) for private labels in the pasta category not only
seems high, it is inconsistent with previous research
(e.g., Lambin 1976).  We conjecture that the relative
stability of the parameter estimates and the high number
of significant coefficients in the LA/AIDS system are
due in large part to the highly flexible form of the
LA/AIDS specification.
Finally, we tested the two demand structures more
formally. Specifically, we tested for the possibility of a
simpler linear functional form by comparing the
LA/AIDS specification to a linear form using a non-
nested P-E test (Davidson and MacKinnon 1981).
Balasubramanian and Jain (1994) suggest that the choice
of non-nested test should be guided by the circumstances
surrounding the test (see, e.g., their Table 7 for the
appropriateness of using the P-E test in the current
application). Jain and Vilcassim (1989) demonstrate that
the sample size requirements for the P-E test may be less
stringent than that required for Lagrange multiplier tests,
suggesting that that it is particularly relevant in our
application. We employ it as detailed in Greene (1997,
pp. 459-462). The results for the demand specification
were even more conclusive than those for within-channel
structure discussed above. For all six categories, the P-E
test cleanly rejected the null of a linear model at p <<
.01.
5. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research
In terms of within-channel behavior, using the six
categories examined in our analysis, assumptions
regarding Manufacturer Stackelberg and proportional
mark-up behavior within the channel are generally
supported. This should provide comfort to theoretical
and empirical researchers alike. On the theoretical side,
this suggests that assumptions regarding within channel
Stackelberg behavior (e.g., Raju, et al. 1995) may be
reasonable characterizations of actual channel behavior.
For empirical research, our results also suggest that the
simplifying assumption of the use of a proportional
mark-up rule (e.g., as used in Kadiyali, Vilcassim and
Chintagunta 1998 and Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar 1998),
which is often needed when data on wholesale prices are
not available, may also be reasonable.
On the demand side, despite some restrictive demand-
side assumptions and a seemingly inflexible functional
form, the Choi (1991) and Raju, et al. (1995) models did
not fare poorly.  We were able to determine which of the
two best fit the data and derive a number of statistically
significant and reasonable elasticities. However, the
volatility of the parameter estimates is disconcerting.
The large number of insignificant coefficients leaves a
researcher without information on key parameter values.
Further, price reaction elasticities over 1.0 seem
questionable even if statistically significant. Further, as
demonstrated elsewhere (Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar 1998,
Genesove and Mullin 1998), linear demands place some
rather restrictive assumptions on channel behavior. For
example, assuming a linear demand implies a fixed and
constant pass-through rate within the channel, imposing
a rather restrictive constraint on vertical strategic
behavior. In contrast, the LA/AIDS framework
introduced above provides us with a flexible functional
form that performs well on a number of individual
categories and does not require similarly restrictive
assumptions on vertical behavior. Non-nested tests
suggested that the improvement in fit in moving to the
non-linear form was significant. All of this suggests that
further theoretical and empirical research examining the
implications of linear demand structures for channel
behavior building on the work of Lee and Staelin (1997)
and Moorthy and Fader (1990) is clearly needed.
This last point illustrates the use of empirical analysisVertical Strategic Interaction and Demand Functional Form Cotterill and Putsis
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of the type conducted here. Empirical analysis should be
viewed as a complement to theoretical research, not as a
challenge to it. Empirical research can guide which
aspects of the theory warrant further investigation, and
as such it should not be limited to testing the
implications of the theory. In the analysis above, we find
that previous assumptions of Manufacturer Stackelberg
behavior and proportional mark-up conduct are generally
reasonable assumptions. In contrast, we find that linear
demands do not fit nearly as well as non-linear forms,
result in questionable demand-side parameter estimates,
and place rather restrictive assumptions on both demand
and channel behavior. Overall, these results should
provide comfort to both theoretical research in the
channels area (e.g., Raju, Sethuraman and Dhar 1995)
that has assumed Manufacturer Stackelberg behavior,
and empirical research that has assumed a proportional
mark-up rule (e.g., Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta
1998). However, the results suggest that assumptions of
a linear demand should be viewed with some caution.
There are a number of limitations of this research. For
example, future research should examine additional
product categories and models. We only examine six
categories. A more extensive examination across
multiple categories and a deeper understanding of the
cross-category variation in observed channel interaction
is needed. In addition, we examine a very limited set of
models and demand structures. This was intentional,
with the objective of keeping the analysis focused and
rigorous. However, this clearly limits our ability to
generalize our findings to other assumptions of channel
behavior, other models of channel relationships and
alternative demand functional forms. Future research
should examine how robust our findings are to the forms
considered. Perhaps most importantly, we consider only
one non-linear form, the LA/AIDS specification. Given
the restrictions placed on vertical conduct as a result of a
linear demand specification, a comprehensive empirical
investigation of non-linear forms, channel behavior and
related passthrough rates is needed. Nonetheless, we
believe that our approach illustrates how empirical
analysis can be used effectively to examine the
underpinnings of theoretical models and to guide future
theoretical and empirical research.
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Chart 1.  Definitions for Variables Used in the Analysis
(All Variables Defined for the ith market, jth category)
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Dependent Variables*
BRSHARE Aggregate share of category expenditure for national brands
PLSHARE Aggregate share of category expenditure for private label products
BRPRICE Natural log of the price of the national brand
PLPRICE Natural log of the price of the private label product
Demand-Shift Variables (D
ij)
EXPENDITURE Natural log of per capita category expenditures deflated by Stone’s price index
BRFEATURE Percent of national brands sold with feature advertising
BRDISPLAY Percent of national brands sold with displays and point-of-sale promotion
PLFEATURE Percent of private label products sold with feature advertising
PLDISPLAY Percent of private label products sold with displays and point-of-sale promotion
BRPRICEREDN Weighted percent average price reduction, national brands
PLPRICEREDN Weighted percent average price reduction, private label products
PLDISTN Private label average distribution
INCOME Natural log of the average household income in the local market
HISPANIC Percent of population in the local market of Hispanic decent
AGE Natural log of the average age of the local market population
Cost Variables (c
ij)
BRVOLPUN Natural log of average volume (weight) per package unit sold for national brand
PLVOLPUN Natural log of average volume (weight) per package unit sold for private label
Variables Controlling for Structural Market Characteristics
HERFINDAHL Herfindahl index of brand concentration in the local market
GROCCR4 Percentage of all grocery sales by the top four grocery chains in the local market
*  Price rather than the natural log of price, and quantity rather than share, are used in the Choi (1991) and Raju,
et al. (1995) models.Vertical Strategic Interaction and Demand Functional Form Cotterill and Putsis
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Table 1. Demand Structure, Manufacturer Stackelberg, and Proportional Mark-up Test Results for Individual
Categories, Linear Model
1
Milk Butter Bread Pasta Margarine Inst. Coffee
Demand Structure
                           (Symmetry Conditions)
(30a) Own-price Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
(30b) Cross-price Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
                              (Choice of Model)
Choi, Raju or Neither
   (Equation 31)  Raju Neither Choi Raju Neither Neither
                 Manufacturer Stackelberg Conduct?
i) National Brand Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
(Equations 32) 
ii) Private Label Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
(Equations 33)
                    Proportional Mark-up Conduct?
i) National Brand Yes Yes Yes Yes * *
(Equation 36)
ii) Private Label Yes Yes Yes * Yes Yes
(Equation 37)
1 All restrictions are tested using a likelihood ratio (LR) test at the 5% significance level.
* As noted in the text, Manufacturer Stackelberg conduct required for proportional mark-up test.
Table 2. Demand and Reaction Elasticities for Individual Product Categories, LA/AIDS Model
Milk Butter Bread Pasta Margarine Inst. Coffee
BR Own Price -1.63 -1.82 -1.80 -1.48 -1.16 -1.05
Elasticity     (-4.20)**     (-3.19)**      (-9.66)**    (-13.90)**    (-21.63)**    (-47.06)**
PL Own Price -1.22 -2.93 -1.66 -2.31 -5.86 -0.100
Elasticity     (-2.81)**      (-4.47)**    (-4.66)**     (-3.38)**    (-6.60)**  (-0.318)
BR Cross Price 0.458 1.39 0.234 0.206 0.474 -0.043
Elasticity (0.513)     (2.94)** (1.86)  (1.91)      (5.47)**     (-2.86)**
PL Cross Price 0.308 1.14 2.26 3.04 1.66 1.05
Elasticity (1.63)  (1.44)    (4.30)**     (4.50)**    (3.01)**   (2.26)*
BR Price Reaction -0.600 0.401 0.322 1.25 1.06 0.070
Elasticity (-1.64)      (3.40)**    (3.39)**    (0.932)      (3.69)**  (1.07)
PL Price Reaction 0.175 0.777 0.321 1.01 0.231 -0.083
Elasticity   (2.10)*     (4.53)** (0.84)      (2.89)** (0.776)  (-0.518)
Average BR Share .30 .54 .62 .81 .84 .94
NOBS 116 112 118 118 118 108
BR = National Brand, PL = Private Label (t-statistics in parentheses)
** significant at the 1% level.  * significant at the 5% levelVertical Strategic Interaction and Demand Functional Form Cotterill and Putsis
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Table 3. Demand and Reaction Elasticities for Individual Product Categories, Linear Model
Milk Butter Bread Pasta Margarine Inst. Coffee
Selected Demand
Structure Raju Choi Choi Raju Choi Raju
BR Own Price -2.74 -0.453 -0.415 -1.12 -1.31 -0.907
Elasticity    (-6.06)**  (-0.676)  (-0.925)       (-8.40)**    (-12.95)**     (-18.37)**
PL Own Price -0.831 -0.245 0.060 -0.609 -7.78 -0.009
Elasticity  (-1.62)  (-0.245)  (0.084)   (-1.02)    (-5.34)**  (-0.028)
BR Cross Price -0.059 -0.020 -0.472 -0.141 0.564 -0.135
Elasticity (-0.057)  (-0.032) (-1.83)  (-1.33)    (3.80)**      (-3.91)**
PL Cross Price 0.769 -1.93 -1.73 0.481 4.18 1.17
Elasticity    (3.40)**  (-1.82)  (-1.38)  (0.641)     (3.95)**      (2.61)**
BR Price Reaction -0.361 0.551 0.307 1.19 1.44 0.039
Elasticity (-1.42)     (5.16)**   (2.25)*  (0.400)      (4.28)**  (0.603)
PL Price Reaction 0.199 0.731 0.740 2.101 0.170 -0.077
Elasticity  (2.39)*     (5.21)**  (2.48)*      (3.77)**  (0.545)  (-0.484)
Average BR Share .30 .54 .62 .81 .84 .94
NOBS 116 112 118 118 118 108
BR = National Brand, PL = Private Label (t-statistics in parentheses)
** significant at the 1% level.  * significant at the 5% levelFOOD MARKETING POLICY CENTER
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